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Abstract 
In this study, we examine the relationship between the structure of financial systems 
and financial crises. Using cross-country data on financial structures and crises, we 
find that there is a significant short-term reversal in development of the banking 
sector and the stock market during both bank crises and market crashes, with the 
corporate bond market moving in the same direction as bank credit. However, the 
results are significant for countries with market-based financial systems but not for 
countries with bank-based financial systems. Emerging markets have mainly 
bank-based financial systems, which may explain why these markets require more 
time to recover from economic downturns after a financial crisis. Therefore, we argue 
that governments should emphasize a balanced financial system structure as it helps 
countries to recover from financial crises more quickly compared with countries that 
lack such balanced structures. 
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1. Introduction 
The existing studies on the structure of financial systems and economic growth 
provide ambiguous results. In a review of those studies, Allen and Oura (2004) 
suggest that the information acquisition and the risk allocation roles of a financial 
system are the two channels that connect the financial system’s structure and 
development to economic growth. However, the roles of stock markets and financial 
intermediaries in allocating resources seem to be different. According to Allen and 
Gale (2000), compared with market-based financial systems, bank-based financial 
systems provide better inter-temporal and worse cross-sectional risk sharing, whereas 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) indicate that bank-based and market-based financial 
systems are distinguished according to their information content. Boot and Thakor 
(2000) show that bank monitoring can better resolve moral hazard problems at the 
firm’s level. Therefore, highly leveraged firms should rely on bank monitoring, 
whereas firms with substantial net worth should rely on market-based financial 
systems.  
Nevertheless, there is still no consistent view on whether one financial system 
structure is better than the other for the real economy in the long term. Some authors 
highlight the role of stock markets in creating incentives and the distortions in bank 
finance. Rajan and Zingales (2001) show that relationship-based financial system 
intermediaries may transmit poor price signals, lead to concentrated information and 
make the financial assets more illiquid. In contrast, in arm’s-length financial systems, 
intermediaries are protected by explicit contracts and transparency, which help them 
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to make worthwhile investments. Allen and Gale (2000) argue that bank-based 
financial systems are more helpful in economies in which most of the major industries 
are associated with conventional manufacturing and technology. Hence, moving 
towards market-based financial systems may not be helpful for all economies. 
However, some authors argue that the structure of financial systems does not 
matter for economic growth. Chakraborty and Ray (2006) use an endogenous growth 
model to show that it is difficult to conclude that one type of financial system is 
invariably better than the other. What matters for growth is the efficiency with which 
a country’s financial system and legal institutions resolve agency problems rather than 
the structure of the financial system the country relies on. 
In addition to this theoretical literature, empirical studies have shed light on the 
performances of these two types of financial system structures. Allen and Gale (2000) 
discuss the financial systems in five industrial countries and find that different 
structures of the systems show similar long-term growth rates. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2001) classify countries into bank-based and market-based financial systems 
and document the tendency for financial systems to become more market-based as 
their economies develop. Levine (2002) confirms the findings of Allen and Gale 
(2000) and documents that distinguished financial structures cannot help to explain 
cross-country differences in long-term economic performance. However, he finds that 
bank-based financial systems promote faster economic growth than market-based 
financial systems in the short term for countries that are at an early stage of 
development. Similar conclusions are also found in some research at the industry or 
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firm level. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) confirm that greater financial 
development accelerates the growth of financial-dependent industries, but financial 
structure does not matter. However, Luintel et al. (2008) have recently shown that the 
complete absence of cross-country support for financial structures reported by some 
panel or cross-section studies may exist because the studies do not sufficiently 
account for cross-country heterogeneity. Accounting for the problems of existing 
studies and using a time series and dynamic heterogeneous panel method, the authors 
show that the structure and the development of the financial systems matter for output 
levels and economic growth. 
However, in our study, we do not consider the nexus of the financial system 
structure and economic growth. Instead, we concentrate only on the changes in the 
structure of the financial system during a financial crisis, which has not been 
addressed in the existing literature. In our opinion, a financial crisis might lead to 
changes in the structure of a financial system; however, the question is whether those 
changes are long term or merely temporary. Moreover, interesting questions are 
whether bank-based or market-based financial systems are more likely to change as a 
result of a financial crisis and whether the magnitude and duration of those 
transformations differ across different financial systems. 
Using a cross-country dataset consisting of developed and emerging countries, we 
document that the financial structures experience short-term reversals after banking 
crises or market crashes. We show that in most emerging markets, which generally do 
not have well-developed stock markets, changes in the financial structures are of a 
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smaller magnitude compared to countries with balanced structure of the financial 
system after a crisis. In contrast, we find that in developed countries, the changes are 
more significant and of longer duration. In our opinion, those changes might reflect 
access to finance by the real sector of the economy during the crisis, which is much 
easier in developed countries because of a more balanced financial system structure. 
The existence of a balanced structure might also explain why the declines in real GDP 
are larger and why it takes longer for emerging market countries than for developed 
economies to recover after banking crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
Our results explain the findings of Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) and Claessens et al. 
(2010). Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) show that if banking crises exogenously hinder real 
activity, the sectors more dependent on external finance tend to have a great 
contraction during the crisis, and the differential effects are stronger in developing 
countries. Claessens et al. (2010) document that when compared with developed 
countries, the recessions and financial disruptions in emerging markets are often more 
costly, and it takes more time for their economies to recover. The authors attribute this 
difference to the fact that emerging countries have less developed financial systems 
than developed countries and, more importantly, do not have sound and developed 
financial system regulations. Hence, when financial disruptions occur, the regulators 
have less power to control and regulate the financial system. As Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2001) have shown, emerging markets are more likely to have a bank-based 
financial system, which could also mean that the structure of the financial system 
matters for the extent of the output loss and the duration of the crisis. 
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Moreover, our results on short-term reversals of financial system structures show 
that a more balanced structure would enhance financial stability. This finding is 
especially true for emerging economies as they tend to be more dependent on banks 
and less dependent on stock markets. Our findings on this point are also supported by 
Laeven and Valencia (2011), who document that government bank recapitalization 
disproportionately supports firms dependent on external finance. However, we find 
that countries with well-developed stock markets, which we assume also have a 
well-developed banking sector, recover from the crises much faster than countries 
without these features. In our opinion, these results are important from a policy 
viewpoint and support the development of a balanced financial system structure. 
However, we also find that previous financial reforms do not impact the structure of 
the financial system after crises. This finding could indicate that financial regulations 
and reforms often cannot prevent financial crises and, furthermore, that the structure 
of the financial system reverts to its previous composition after a crisis. This 
conclusion is consistent with that of Beck et al. (2006), who study the impact of bank 
concentration and regulation on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic 
banking crisis. The authors show that crises are less likely to occur when a country 
has a more concentrated banking system. However, the authors also find that 
regulatory policies might hinder competition, which might trigger greater bank 
instability. 
Macroeconomic factors also influence the stability of financial systems. 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) demonstrate a close connection between the 
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exchange rate and financial fragility from three points of view: the moral hazard 
hypothesis, the original sin hypothesis and the commitment problem hypothesis. 
Chang and Velasco (2000) develop a general equilibrium model, showing that in a 
world in which banks play a well-defined microeconomic role, different nominal 
exchange rate regimes induce varying degrees of financial fragility. Thus, we also 
control for the factor of exchange markets as it may influence financial system 
stability in an interconnected world. Girton and Roper (1977) define exchange market 
pressure (EMP) as the sum of exchange rate depreciation and the movements of 
international reserves. On the basis of that definition, Eichengreen et al. (1994, 1995) 
add the interest rate differential as a factor to compute the EMP index. Using this 
definition, we also investigate the impact of EMP on the structure of financial systems 
during crises. 
In addition to the exchange market pressure, we also consider inflation as an 
external factor. Honohan (2003) argues that inflation has two contrasting effects on 
the financial system. One effect is that inflation increases the demand for financial 
services and the profitability of banks. Second, the interaction of inflation with a 
non-indexed tax system is often associated with an effective rate of taxation on 
financial intermediation, resulting in wide intermediation margins and a reduced scale 
of intermediation. Moreover, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Claessens et al. 
(2001) demonstrate a positive relationship between inflation and bank profitability.  
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argue that common law countries generally provide 
the strongest protection for investors, whereas French civil law countries have the 
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weakest protection, which might influence the development of financial systems. 
Indeed, Beck et al. (2001) show that the efficiency of the legal system matters more 
than financial structure for inducing higher economic growth. Based on this, the work 
of Beck et al. (2003) and La Porta et al. (2008) provides qualified support for both law 
and finance theory and endowment theory. The authors suggest that historical 
differences in legal origin can explain current cross-country differences in financial 
development, whereas geographical endowments as measured by settler mortality 
tend to account more significantly for financial development. 
In addition, Beck et al. (2001) examine the nexus of politics and financial system 
development. The authors find that political structure variables do not directly explain 
most differences in financial development among different countries, whereas both 
the law and finance theory and the endowment theory still work through political 
forces. In contrast, Roe and Siegel (2011) argue that political instability is another 
primary determinant of the differences in financial development around the world. 
According to these authors, political instability influences financial system 
development and hence economic growth. 
Therefore, using these studies, we decide to control for legal origin and the 
enforcement of laws as these factors may influence the development and structure of 
the financial system after a crisis. Indeed, our results show that the rights of creditors 
are always beneficial for the development of banking systems before and after 
banking crises. Moreover, financial reforms appear to support the increase in bank 
credit during crises, whereas the effects seem to be quite mixed during normal periods. 
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Additionally, we add the factors of legal origin and political stability into our 
regressions and find that the statistical results are not altered, which confirms the 
robustness of the main results. 
Our work contributes to the literature in several ways. Most importantly, our study 
advances knowledge of the development and structure of financial systems. Therefore, 
our work shows the impact of an additional factor on the development of financial 
system structures, which has been ignored in previous work. Second, by studying how 
a crisis influences the structure of financial systems, we provide new evidence on the 
financial system relation to the real sector of the economy. Finally, our study is 
important from a regulatory point of view as we show that authorities should focus 
not only on the development of the financial system but also on creating a more 
diversified financial system structure. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and the 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the econometric model we employ and the 
empirical results. Section 4 presents the results of our sensitivity analysis and the 
discussion. Section 5 offers conclusions. 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our data set consists of observations for 69 countries, including developed and 
developing countries, over the period 1970-2009. First, we construct indicators for the 
structure of the financial system using the methodology and revised database of Beck et 
al. (2010). In the event of missing information, we use the data from Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2001). We use the database of Laeven and Valencia (2010) to establish the 
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year of the banking crises, and we use the data from Sornette (2002) on the market 
crises. We also employ data from Abiad and Mody (2005) and Abiad et al. (2010) for 
the set of the control variables on financial regulations. Table 1 presents the description 
and sources of all the variables used in this study. 
[Table 1] 
As many financial crises persist for multiple years, it is often difficult to determine 
an exact end date of the crises. Furthermore, Beck et al. (2006) argue that during a 
crisis, it likely takes time to affect the behavior of some of the explanatory variables. 
Therefore, we use data both on the initial and second year of the crisis to represent the 
start of the banking or market crisis, where year ∈[0,1] stands for the initial years of the 
financial crises. Using this period, we establish the structure of the financial system for 
five years prior to the crises and ten years after it. 
2.1. Variable definitions 
2.1.1. Definitions of banking crises and market crashes 
In this paper, we differentiate between banking crises and market crashes. We 
follow Laeven and Valencia (2008) and refer to a systemic banking crisis when a 
country’s corporate and financial sectors experience numerous defaults. In a systemic 
banking crisis, non-performing loans increase dramatically, and most of the aggregate 
banking system capital is shorty exhausted. As a result, this process always leads to 
many output losses. However, during banking crises, there may also be a concurrent 
decline in stock market prices. Nevertheless, the reasons for stock market crashes are 
more subtle and diversified. Sornette (2002) indicates that a stock market crash occurs 
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because the market has entered an unstable phase, and any small disturbance may 
trigger the instability. A stock market crash fundamentally has an endogenous or 
internal origin, whereas exogenous or external shock may function only as triggering 
factors. Mishkin and White (2002) document that stock market crashes may be 
attributed to the expectation of an economic downturn or a loss of “irrational 
exuberance”. Therefore, the origin of market crashes is more diversified and may not 
always be related to problems present in the banking system. Moreover, a market 
crash is more likely to be associated with the irrational expectations of investors, not 
only economic fundamentals. Consequently, banking crises may not always occur 
concurrently with stock market crashes and vice versa.  
Because minor alterations in economic fundamentals are always successive, it is 
not easy to provide an exact definition and differentiation of a banking crisis. In this 
paper, we use the starting dates of systemic banking crises provided by Laeven and 
Valencia (2010). However, we focus only on those banking crises with an output loss 
of over 10 percent because we assume that only a large banking crisis might lead to 
significant changes in the structure of the financial system. Using this criterion, we 
are able to identify 75 major systematic banking crises in 65 countries, with 10 
countries experiencing two crisis episodes during the past 39 years. 
To identify stock market crashes, we use the data of Sornette (2002) on stock 
market crashes, which analyzes most of the regional market crashes from 1980 to 
2002. Based on this data, our study includes 17 market crashes, which occurred in 15 
countries. The countries and the years of with the systemic banking crises and market 
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crash in our sample are presented in Table 2. 
[Table 2] 
Sornette (2002) indicates that stock markets around the world are strongly 
influenced by trends in the U.S. market. Thus, the 1987 October crash in the U.S. 
almost immediately became an international event. In contrast, stock market crashes 
in Latin America in the 1990s, Asia in 1997, and Russia in 1998 were mainly related 
to a subsequence of regional crises. Hence, market crises are more dependent on 
contagion and correlations across markets, which directly lead to the pronounced 
synchronization of a bubble collapse within one region. As a result, a systematic 
banking crisis might differ significantly from a market crisis. Nevertheless, we 
assume that this difference will not impact our results. Moreover, recent studies 
document that a banking crisis can be transmitted through lending channels across 
countries (Allen et al., 2010). 
2.1.2. Measures of financial structure 
We employ indicators for banking and market size in a country to measure the 
structure of the financial system. In addition, we add the size of the corporate bond 
market as a control variable, which we measure relative to GDP. Corporate bonds are 
similar in construction to loans, but may provide better cross-sectional risk sharing 
than bank loans (Allen and Gale, 2000). As a result, we treat corporate bonds as a 
separate part of the financial system and do not classify it as a component of the 
bank-based or market-based financial systems. 
To control for the size of the banking sector, we use three variables: bank credit to 
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GDP, private credit to GDP, and bank assets to GDP. The ratio of bank credit to GDP 
equals the domestic credit by deposit money banks to the private sector as a share of 
GDP, whereas private credit to GDP equals all the credit issued by financial 
institutions to the private sector as a share of GDP but excludes the credit by central 
banks. Table 3 shows that all three indicators for the size of the banking sector are 
highly correlated during the crises. 
[Table 3] 
In addition to the size of the banking sector, we also use bank concentration as an 
indicator of the banking sector’s market structure. Allen and Gale (2000, 2004) 
document that a less concentrated banking system with more banks is more prone to 
financial crises than a concentrated banking system with a few banks. Moreover, 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) show that a more concentrated banking structure 
enhances banking fragility. Beck et al. (2006) demonstrate that when controlling for 
the factors of banking regulation, bank competition and macroeconomic conditions, 
crises are less likely to occur in economies with more concentrated banking 
structures. 
We use five variables to measure the development of equity markets: stock market 
capitalization to GDP, stock market total value traded to GDP, stock market turnover 
ratio, the number of listed companies per 10k population and raised capital to GDP. 
Our data show that all the indicators increase with countries’ income level, with 
higher-income countries having significantly larger stock markets by size and volume 
than middle and low-income countries, which is consistent with the findings of 
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Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001). 
The stock market capitalization to GDP is a measure of the size of the stock 
market and is widely used in the literature as a measure of stock market development. 
However, Allen et al. (2006) have indicated that this measure has several drawbacks. 
First, this measure only captures the present value of the listed equity but cannot 
reflect the amount of funding actually obtained by all the listed companies in the 
economy. Second, the indicator may be influenced by some highly capitalized 
companies in the equity market, which may cause the market to appear very 
developed when it is not. Third, this measure may also be influenced by the highly 
frequent movement in the stock market. Therefore, we decide that the ratio of raised 
capital to GDP would be a better measure, and we retrieved the information from the 
World Federation of Exchanges. However, the data cover only the period from 
1996-2008. Therefore, we decide to use the number of listed companies per 10k 
population as an alternative indicator of market size. Stock markets could be sizable 
because of numerous listings, but they may be illiquid or shallow because of a lack of 
active trading. Hence, in the regressions, we use the variables on the stock market 
value traded to GDP and the stock market turnover ratio to control for stock market 
illiquidity. 
In recent years, financial system structures around the world have more developed 
market-based financial systems (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009). The situation is 
more present in high-income countries and less pronounced in developing countries. 
In developed countries, the rapid increase in stock market capitalization was largely 
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related to the development of securitization techniques, which has transformed the 
way in which many types of transactions, which would previously have been 
conventional bank loans, are structured (Allen and Santomero, 2001). In the last 
decade, the growing importance of securitization was especially obvious in the 
transformation of traditional mortgages, which finally led to the financial crisis of 
2007-2008. Hence, our paper may also indicate whether countries’ financial system 
structures may change again after the recent crisis. 
2.1.3. Financial structure determinants 
Existing studies show that macroeconomic conditions and financial and 
institutional frameworks may determine countries’ financial system structures. 
Therefore, in the regressions, we employ the following macroeconomic indicators: 
GDP per capita, the percentage change in the GDP deflator, or inflation rate, and the 
EMP index. The macroeconomic data were retrieved from the World Bank WDI 
database, whereas we follow Tanner (2001) and define the EMP index as the sum of 
the exchange rate depreciation and reserve outflows (scaled by base money). Tanner 
(2001) uses the EMP index, which was first defined by Girton and Roper (1977) and 
later extended by Eichengreen et al. (1994, 1995) with the weighted average of the 
exchange rate, reserve and interest rate changes. 
We control for financial reforms using the database of Abiad and Mody (2005) 
and Abiad et al. (2010), who constructed an index of financial reforms along seven 
different dimensions: credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate control, 
entry barriers, state ownership, policies on equity markets, banking regulations and 
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restrictions on financial accounts. The database also includes the subindex of banking 
regulation and equity market policies, but it does not vary significantly across the 
crisis periods. Therefore, we decide to employ only the financial reform index. 
The financial reform index shows that reforms have advanced substantially in 
many countries in the past 30 years. However, we find that during or following crises, 
the index does not change significantly. This finding is consistent with that of Barth et 
al. (2004), who argue that the regulatory restrictions on bank activities do not change 
significantly after systemic banking crises. Moreover, Barth et al. (2008) report that 
some countries imposed additional restrictions on bank activities, which appeared to 
increase the probability of a systemic banking crisis between 20 and 40 percent, 
whereas other countries relaxed restrictions on bank activities by allowing banks to 
diversify their income sources, which has positive impacts on banking system stability. 
Tressel and Detragiache (2009), who also examine the impact of financial reforms on 
financial system development, show that the effectiveness of reforms on financial 
deepening has materialized only if the institutional environment was sufficiently 
favorable. Specifically, in that study, the response of bank credit to reforms was not 
significantly positive. Hence, there is no consistent evidence that financial reforms 
increase the effectiveness of the financial system. 
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) document that the structure of a financial system is a 
product, not a cause, of legal structure. Following La Porta et al. (1997), we employ 
four variables: legal origin, rule of law, antidirector rights and creditor rights. La Porta 
et al. (1997) report that countries legal systems originate from a limited number of 
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legal traditions: English common law or French, German and Scandinavian civil law. 
The authors find that the common law system tends to grant the best protection to 
external private investors. As a result, the system facilitates the development of a 
market-based financial system. In contrast, countries with French legal origin tend to 
grant the worst protection of private property rights; therefore, a bank-based financial 
system is more likely to emerge in those countries. 
The other three indexes indicate legal enforcement from the perspectives of 
investors, shareholders and creditors. A rule of law index is built based on a survey, 
which is an assessment by investors in different countries of the legal environment 
and the quality of law enforcement. An antidirector rights index describes minority 
shareholder rights, such as votes, control power and the availability of mechanisms 
for making legal claims against the directors, whereas a creditor rights index 
aggregates the various rights of creditors in liquidation and reorganization. The first 
two indexes facilitate the development of the stock markets, whereas the last index 
facilitates the development of a bank-based financial system. 
 Finally, Roe and Siegel (2011) mention that periods of political instability may 
also impede the development of financial systems. Hence, we also use the annual 
polity scores from the Polity IV Project2 to control for the quality and stability of 
political institutions. The polity score is a consolidated index describing the political 
regime characteristics and stability of a country. 
2.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
2 The Political IV Database can be found at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
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In Tables 3 and 4, we present the summary statistics and correlations among 
different indicators of banking sectors and stock markets during crises.  
[Table 4] 
We find that the main index of banking system size, bank credit to GDP, has a 
pair-wise correlation with private credit to GDP of 0.82, but this index has a much 
higher correlation of 0.97 with bank assets to GDP. In the regression, we use all three 
proxies for banking system size as private credit includes the credits issued by 
non-bank financial institutions. Allen et al. (2006) mention that credit granted by 
non-bank financial institutions to the private sector grows more as a proportion of the 
total credits by financial systems as a country develops. However, bank assets to GDP 
show only the size of the banking system itself, whereas bank credit to the private 
sector is more related to the role of the banking system in the real economy. We find, 
however, that bank concentration is not significantly correlated with any of those 
three proxy indicators for the size of the banking system. 
 The indicators of stock market development all show positive correlations with 
one other, whereas the stock market turnover ratio has lower correlations with stock 
market capitalization and the number of listed companies, which is consistent with the 
definition as this indicator measures stock market trading. Similarly, we employ all 
the indicators of stock market development with banking system proxies to examine 
how the structure of the financial system evolves during banking crises and market 
crashes. 
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3. Methodology and results 
We employ the ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regressions to analyze the 
changes in the structure of the financial system structure.  
3.1. Methodology 
In the study, we use different regression models to assess the impact of financial 
crises on the structure of financial systems in different countries. First, we use a 
model with country-fixed effects to address the time consistency of the variables. In 
our regression, it is crucial to partial out the time inconsistency of the variables that 
might explain the evolvement of the financial system structure. As argued by Rajan 
and Zingales (2003), it is imperative to test whether the variables have a consistently 
positive or negative impact on the dependent variables over time. However, the test is 
not easy as financial system development indicators show quite different 
performances during crises than during normal periods. Therefore, to address possibly 
unobserved heterogeneity, we first employ country-fixed effects to partial out the 
time-invariant factors. Additionally, we add time-fixed effects to further address 
endogeneity concerns. As a result, we estimated the following model:  
Bank Credit/ GDPi = β0 + β1 ∗ Stock Market Indicatori + β2 ∗
Bank Concentration Indicator +  β3 ∗ Xi + β4 ∗ Yi + εi    (1)  
where the banking sector development for country i is jointly determined by the 
development of the stock market, the concentration of the banking sector, a series of 
macroeconomic indicators shown by 𝑋𝑖, which includes a log of GDP per capita, the 
inflation rate and the exchange market pressure index, and a series of other 
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explanatory variables shown by 𝑌𝑖, which includes variables of financial reforms, 
legal origin, law enforcement, and political stability; additionally, 𝜀𝑖 is the error term 
in the equation. We also use bank assets to GDP or total private credit to GDP as the 
dependent variable and estimate the same model.  
Then, using (1), we further estimate the effects of the corporate bond market on 
the banking systems during the crises by adding the indicator of corporate bond 
market capitalization to GDP to our previous model: 
Bank Credit/ GDPi = β0 + β1 ∗ Stock Market Indicatori + β2 ∗
Bank Concentration Indicator +  β3 ∗ Bond Market Indicatori + β4 ∗ Xi + β5 ∗
Yi + εi       (2) 
 To address the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity, we use country-fixed 
effects to partial out time invariant factors, although when we fit legal origin dummies 
into our models, only random country-effects work.  
Another solution to address the unobserved heterogeneity would be to employ 
the GMM dynamic method. Roodman (2007), however, shows that for short-panel 
econometrics, difference and system GMM regressions may often suffer from weak 
instrumentation, generating estimators that are invalid yet appear valid in 
specification tests. 
3.2. Main results 
3.2.1. Structure of financial systems and banking crises 
Table 5 presents the changes in the financial system structures of countries that 
experienced a banking crisis in the years 1970-2009. The coefficients for the proxies 
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for stock market development, including stock market capitalization, stock market 
total value traded and stock market turnover ratio, have a positive sign before the 
banking crises and become negatively related to the dependent variable during the 
crises. This reversal of stock market development does not last for a long period, so 
we call this “short-term reversal” in the structure of the financial system. Two years 
following the occurrence of banking crises, the trend returns to the situation of the 
pre-crises periods, but the coefficients for proxies showing the development of the 
stock market are not significant until five years after the crises. This result indicates 
that during the third to the fifth years after the crises, the stock market has not shown 
a significantly and strongly positive relationship with the banking sector as it does 
during a normal period, whereas after five years of the banking crises, the stock 
market evolves significantly in the same way as the banking system as in the 
pre-crises periods.  
[Table 5] 
In Table 6, we show the results for the regressions when we employ the 
subsample of countries with severe banking crises. The results show that after a 
severe banking crisis, the short-term reversal in the structure of the financial system 
lasts longer as we find that both stock market capitalization and stock market total 
value traded begin to reverse to pre-crisis development after four years. 
We find, however, that the variable of the number of listed companies per 10k 
population is significant and negatively correlated to bank credit before the crises. 
Additionally, this variable remains negative after the crisis until the fourth year, 
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whereas it is also statistically significant. In the fifth year, the sign changes, but the 
variable is insignificant. However, this variable behaves the same way as other 
variables for stock market development when we employ the subsample of severe 
banking crises.  
In contrast to the main results, this indicator of stock market development is not 
tainted by the fluctuations of stock prices and possible mismeasurement of the GDP 
level. Indeed, this indicator may show better than market capitalization the 
importance of equity markets in the financial system (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
However, some drawbacks remain as the variable may be too slow to capture the 
highly frequent changes in stock markets and cannot show the actual number of the 
raised capital in the market. Moreover, some countries with more concentrated 
industrial structures will have fewer but larger companies listed, which may reduce 
the number according to this measurement. Other countries may have many 
companies listed, but the equity market may be shallow. 
Hence, we use the ratio of total raised capital to GDP as an alternative proxy, 
which may overcome some of the drawbacks. However, in this case, the number of 
observations is reduced, and we cover only ten crises as we have data only for the 
period 1995 to 2009. Using this proxy, we find that the reversal appears to last longer 
and be significant even during the fifth to tenth years after the crises. This result 
should indicate that the stock market will require more time to recover after a severe 
banking crisis, especially for the equity market, although our results could be biased 
due to the sample selection. 
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[Table 6] 
3.2.2. Structure of the financial system and market crashes 
Using a similar approach, we also examine the changes in the financial system 
structures during market crashes in the years 1980-2008. The results are presented in 
Table 7. A difference from our previous results is that the reversal now lasts for nearly 
five years after a market crash, which means that after a market crash, the financial 
intermediaries require more time to recover than equity markets after a banking crisis. 
This finding is reasonable as market crashes often have a direct impact on financial 
intermediaries and their assets’ value. Consequently, financial intermediaries may take 
more time to return to assets levels observed prior to the crisis.  
This explanation is also consistent with the arguments provided by Claessens et 
al. (2010), who show that the recessions associated with equity price busts are always 
much deeper and longer than those without market crashes in emerging markets. A 
similar situation can also be observed in developed countries, although the effect is 
not as significant as in emerging economies.  
Another explanation for the results is that stock market disruptions are often 
regional through strong linkages and stock market co-movements. King and 
Wadhwani (1990) show that correlations tend to increase in times of large shocks to 
returns, such as a stock market crash. However, using nonparametric estimation, 
Hartmann et al. (2004) demonstrate that simultaneous crashes in stock markets are 
very likely and that extreme cross-border linkages are surprisingly similar to national 
linkages. 
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[Table 7] 
3.2.3. Subsamples 
As our results show differences in the impact of the bank and market crashes on 
the structure of the financial systems, we decide to divide the countries in our sample 
according to their financial system structure. We follow Levine (2002) and 
differentiate countries as either having a bank-based or a market-based financial 
system.  
Using this subsample, we test again the changes in the structure of the financial 
system after a banking crisis, whereas the dependent variables remain the bank 
credit/GDP and the bank assets/GDP. The results in Table 8 show that a country’s 
prior financial system structure determines its evolution after a banking crisis. In 
countries with market-based financial systems, the changes in the equity market are 
strongly related to the situation in the banking sector. Prior to the crisis, the variable 
of stock market capitalization is positive and significant. After the banking crisis, the 
coefficient changes its sign, but the variable is insignificant. However, the variable 
market capitalization is again positive and significant in the fifth year. In contrast, in 
countries with bank-based financial systems, the crisis seems not to have a strong 
effect on the equity market as the coefficient for market capitalization is insignificant 
in all the specifications. 
We assume that a country with a bank-based financial system may not have a 
well-developed stock market, which is often the case in emerging markets. In contrast, 
in countries with market-based financial systems, it is very likely that the banking 
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industry is also well developed. Hence, in countries with balanced financial system 
structures, enterprises can more easily shift financing from banks to markets or vice 
versa during a crisis. The change of financial channels might explain our results and 
would confirm the findings of Classens et al. (2010). The authors show that the 
temporal dynamics of macroeconomic and financial indicators during a crisis are very 
different in emerging economies than in developed economies. In emerging markets, 
the economic recessions and financial disruptions are often more costly, and the 
markets take more time to recover after the crises. As Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2001) document, in most emerging markets, the financial system is bank-based. 
Consequently, in those countries, it is more difficult for enterprises to use different 
financing channels, which would explain the long and costly duration of the crisis. In 
contrast, developed countries have either balanced or market-based financial systems, 
which allow the companies to shift more easily from one channel to another during a 
crisis; consequently, the economy may recover much faster. 
Moreover, the results show that the reversal of the financial system structures is 
economically much larger in the subsample of the market-based countries than in the 
full sample. The coefficient estimates show that a rise in stock market capitalization is 
associated with a 30 percent reduction in bank credit and a 34 percent reduction in 
bank assets in countries with market-based financial systems. When we use the full 
sample for the same period, the results show that an increase in the market 
capitalization is only associated with a 17 percent reduction in bank credit. Hence, in 
addition to being statistically significant, the empirical results suggest that an 
26 
 
undeveloped stock market will make the financial system more fragile in an 
economically important manner.  
[Table 8] 
3.3. Structure of the financial system and macroeconomic indicators 
Macroeconomic indicators may determine the structure of the financial system 
and its changes during and after the crises. Therefore, in the regression, we employ 
additional macroeconomic indicators, including GDP per capita, the inflation rate and 
the exchange market pressure index. We also control for bank concentration because 
in an interconnected global financial system, the high level of industry concentration 
would make the financial sector more vulnerable to extreme events.  
Table 9 shows that the relationship between banking credit and stock market 
capitalization remains unchanged and significant when we control for more 
macroeconomic variables. The indicator of GDP per capita has an insignificantly 
negative impact on the bank credit during the crises but the opposite effect during 
normal periods. Inflation tends to have a negative impact on bank credit during most 
periods, a result consistent with the finding that a higher level of inflation would lead 
to a reduced scale of intermediation (Honohan, 2003). The effect of the exchange 
market pressure seems to be quite mixed, but the coefficient is insignificant in all the 
regressions. 
[Table 9] 
3.4. The role of corporate bond markets 
As mentioned, we also decide to examine the impact of the corporate bond 
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market on banking systems during a crisis. Herring and Chatusripitak (2001) argue 
that the undeveloped state of the corporate bond market in the financial system may 
induce a country’s economy to rely on bank lending. As an example, the authors 
present Thailand’s corporate bond market, which is heavily undeveloped relative to 
the equity market and the banking sector, which might explain the large economic 
costs of the Asian crisis in 1997. In contrast, Arteta (2005) indicates that a stronger 
reliance on the corporate bond market relative to the banking sector can lead to faster 
growth of output in normal periods, whereas such reliance does not show any benefits 
during a banking crisis. Therefore, the role of the corporate bond market during a 
financial crisis is rather inconclusive. 
To consider the role of the corporate bond market during a banking crisis, we run 
the ratio of corporate bond market capitalization to GDP as another explanatory 
variable in model (2). We first use stock market capitalization as an indicator of stock 
market size. We find that the coefficient for corporate bond market capitalization is 
significant in almost all the specifications, as shown in Table 12. This finding means 
that the corporate bond market is moving the same way as the banking sector, rather 
than substituting for bank loans as we may have expected. The results remain 
unchanged when we use the number of listed companies per 10k population as the 
indicator. 
Furthermore, we find that the coefficient for corporate bond market capitalization 
is economically quite large in the regressions. A rise of one unit of change of bond 
market capitalization will result in a 59 percent increase in bank credit in normal 
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periods and a 72 percent increase during the crises. Hence, our results indicate that the 
development of corporate bond markets may not help to alleviate a downturn during 
banking crises. One explanation for the results is that the corporate bond market is 
dominated by financial institutions, especially in recent years through the 
securitization process of loans. Consequently, our result shows that a better choice is 
to develop a balanced financial system with strong stock markets, especially for 
emerging countries, which are more vulnerable to banking crises; nonetheless, the 
role of the corporate bond market should not be ignored. 
4. Sensitivity analysis and discussion 
We test the sensitivity of our results and control for other variables suggested in 
the literature, which may also influence a country's financial system structure and 
development. Finally, we discuss the implications of our results from a policy point of 
view.  
4.1. Did reforms change financial structures during crises? 
First, we add the indicator of financial reform as an explanatory variable to our 
regressions. Table 10 shows that the coefficient for stock market capitalization does 
not change and remains significant in the specification after we have added the 
control variable for the financial reform. The financial reform variable, however, 
enters the regression with an insignificantly negative sign before and after the banking 
crises and with an insignificantly positive sign during the crises. The result is 
consistent with the existing findings, which argue that financial reforms have quite 
mixed influences on the deepening and the stability of financial systems (Tressel and 
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Detragiche, 2009).  
The relationship between the degree of regulatory restrictiveness and banking 
sector development is also inconclusive. Barth et al. (2008) have demonstrated that a 
financial system does not develop very differently after reforms. Moreover, Barth et al. 
(2004) show that countries with more restrictive regulation systems — especially 
restrictions on the securities activities of banks — have a higher probability of 
suffering a banking crisis. Consequently, the effects of financial reforms and 
restrictions on financial system development seem to be uncertain. 
However, the results indicate that one reason might be the problem of 
enforcement, which could mean that new regulations are in place but do not take 
effect. As a result, according to the estimations, the effectiveness of financial reforms 
still needs to be improved in the future. 
[Table 10] 
4.2. Legal environment 
In the next regression, we first add the variable of credit rights with financial 
reforms to check the robustness of our results. Similarly, as shown in Table 10, the 
coefficient for financial reforms enters with a positive sign during banking crises but a 
negative sign before and after the crises. Again, the results are not very significant. 
The indicator of creditor rights enters the regression with positive signs, and the 
results are significant in most specifications except the years during the occurrence of 
banking crises. Therefore, we assume that the rights of creditors are always beneficial 
for the development of banking systems, and the impact of these rights may not be 
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sufficiently strong enough only during banking crises. Hence, the effect of financial 
reforms on financial structures is inconclusive. 
Next, we control for several other legal variables, including rules of law, 
antidirector rights, credit rights and legal origin, and find that the results do not 
change for the short-term reversal of financial system structures during banking crises. 
The coefficients of stock market capitalization to GDP are significant during different 
time periods. Hence, the results are statistically stronger compared with our main 
estimation.  
In the regression, the coefficients for English common law and French civil law 
are not significant, whereas the German civil law dummy is positive and significant 
after crises. Hence, our result shows that German civil law is more beneficial for 
banking systems to recover after banking crises. 
To check the robustness of the results, we also change the dependent variable 
with the ratio of bank assets to GDP and run the regressions again. Table 13 shows 
that the results are not altered. We find again that German civil law may help the 
impaired banking systems to recover better after banking crises. 
[Table 13] 
4.3. Political regime 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) propose a theory of financial development based on 
controlling interest group politics and argue that incumbents’ opposition will be 
weaker when studies allow for cross-border capital flows. La Porta et al. (2008) argue 
that political changes may provide the impetus for countries to improve their laws and 
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regulations. Based on these studies, the work of Roe and Siegel (2011) demonstrates 
that political stability has a significant, consistent and substantial impact on financial 
development over many decades, especially debt and stock market development. 
Therefore, we decide to check the robustness of the results by adding political regime 
characteristics into the regressions. Table 11 shows that our main results are not 
altered by those factors. 
Finally, we use the total private credit to GDP instead of bank assets to GDP as a 
dependent variable in the robustness test. The result in Table 14 again documents 
short-term reversal in the structure of the financial system during a banking crisis, but 
financial reform does not play an important role in the process.  
[Table 14] 
Finally, the inclusions of the control variables for legal origin and political 
regime characteristics show that our results for the short-term reversal of financial 
system structures during banking crises are robust and consistent. 
5. Conclusions 
In our paper, we use data on 75 banking crises and 17 market crashes over the 
period 1970 to 2009 to examine the link between changes in the structures of financial 
systems and financial crisis. Our results show that there is a short-term reversal in the 
structure of the financial system during both banking crises and market crashes. 
However, we do not find that the corporate bond market is a substitute for the banking 
sector as it moves in the same direction as bank credit during a financial crisis. An 
explanation for the results could be the securitization process of loans, which has 
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resulted in the dominance of financial institutions in the corporate bond market in 
recent years.  
We argue that our results have important implications for financial reforms, 
especially in emerging markets. First, our results show that regulators need to pay 
more attention to the architecture of a financial system to make the entire financial 
system safer. According to our evidence, after a bank crisis, the stock markets develop 
faster, and the financial system evolves toward a market-oriented financial system. 
Therefore, financial regulations should not only focus on the banking sector because it 
experiences problems but should also monitor the development of the stock markets. 
In addition, our results show that compared with countries with bank-based 
financial systems, countries with market-based financial systems appear to have a 
more significant reversal during banking crises. Hence, changes in financial structure 
are not the same among different countries during and after crises. This result means 
that countries may have to coordinate financial reforms and regulations to ensure 
consistency after a crisis.  
Second, significant changes in the structure of a financial system are difficult 
even during banking crises and market crashes. As the banking sector and equity 
market appear to substitute for each other during a financial crisis, a better developed 
banking system or equity market will help to recover from financial disruption and 
economic downturn. However, for emerging economies, changing to a 
market-oriented financial system to avoid too much vulnerability during crises in the 
short term may not be a feasible option; thus, a stronger focus on equity market 
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development should be established in developing countries.  
Finally, in this paper, we have not considered the economic growth of countries 
with different financial system structures during a crisis. The short-term reversal 
within a financial system may impact the growth of the real economy. As Allen et al. 
(2006) have already demonstrated the empirical link between the economic structure 
and the financial structure, the economic structure may also influence the recovery of 
the real economy after a banking crisis or market crash. Hence, in future research, it 
will be interesting to examine the relationship between financial structure and 
recovery after a crisis occurs. 
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Table 1.  
Description of main variables and data sources 
 Banking Sector Development 
Bank Credit Equals the amount of private credit by money banks divided by GDP  
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (2008)3 
Private Credit Equals the amount of private credit by money banks and other financial institutions divided by GDP  
Bank Assets Equals deposit money bank assets divided by GDP per year 
Bank 
Concentration 
Equals the share of total banking assets held by the three largest banks 
 Stock Market Development 
Stock Market Equals stock market capitalization divided by GDP  
 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (2008) 
Total Value 
Traded 
Equals stock market total value traded divided by GDP 
Turnover Ratio A ratio measures how often stock shares change hands 
No. of Listed 
Companies 
Equals the number of listed companies divided by the amount of 10k population 
Capital Raised Equals capital newly raised plus capital already raised and then divided by GDP  World Federation of 
Exchanges Statistics;  
World Bank Statistics 
                                 Bond Market Development 
Bond Market Corporate Bond Market Capitalization divided by GDP Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (2008) 
 Financial Reform and Regulation 
Financial 
Reform Index 
A conglomerate index recognizes the multifaceted nature of financial reform and regulation, 
including seven different dimensions: credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate 
controls, entry barriers, state ownership, securities market regulation, banking regulation and 
restrictions on financial accounts. 
 
Abiad, Detragiache 
and Tressel (2010) 
 Law Origins 
Legal Origin Index created by coding countries by legal origin, which can be divided into four categories-  
 
3 We use the CEIC database and World Bank Statistics to add the missing data for China. 
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English Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law and Scandinavian Civil Law.  
LLSV (1997) 
 
Rule of Law An investors’ survey-based estimate of the quality of law enforcement 
Creditor Rights An index aggregating the various rights of creditors in liquidation and reorganization 
Antidirector 
Rights 
An index describing minority shareholder rights 
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Table 2.  
Sample of crises: 1980-2008 
The table shows the sample we use for banking crises and market crashes. The sample of banking 
crises is selected according to L. Laeven and F.V. Valencia (2008) Systemic banking crises: A new 
Database, IMF Working Paper No. 08/224 and L. Laeven, and F.V. Valencia (2010) Resolution of 
banking crises: The good, the bad and the ugly, IMF Working Paper No. 10/146; all the crises in the 
sample have an output loss over 10%. The sample of market crashes is selected according to D. 
Sornette (2002) Why stock markets crash: Critical events in complex financial system, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. 
Banking Crises Market Crashes 
Algeria (1990) Haiti (1994) Philippines (1983) China (1998) 
Argentina (1980, 2001) Hungary (2008) Portugal (2008) Indonesia (1997) 
Austria (2008) Iceland (2008) Sierra Leone (1990) Korea, Rep. (1994) 
Belgium (2008) Indonesia (1997) Slovenia (2008) Malaysia (1994) 
Benin (1988) Ireland (2008) Spain (1977, 2008) Thailand  (1994) 
Bolivia (1986) Israel (1977) Sri Lanka (1989) Russian Federation (1997) 
Brazil (1990) Jamaica (1996) Swaziland (1995) Philippines (1994) 
Bulgaria (1996) Japan (1997) Sweden (1991, 2008) United States (1987; 2001) 
Burundi (1994) Jordan (1989) Thailand (1983, 1997) Argentina (1997) 
Cameroon (1987) Kenya (1992) Togo (1993) Brazil (1997) 
Chile (1976) Korea, Rep. (1997) Turkey (1982, 2000) Mexico (1997) 
China (1998) Kuwait (1982) United Kingdom (2008) Venezuela, RB (1997) 
Colombia (1982, 1998) Latvia (2008) United States(1988. 2007) Peru (1997) 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
(1991) 
Lebanon (1990) Uruguay (1981, 2002) Chile (1994) 
Congo, Rep. (1992) Luxembourg (2008) Yemen, Rep. (1996) Hong Kong, China (1987; 
1997) 
Denmark (2008) Malaysia (1997) Zambia (1995)  
Djibouti (1991) Mexico (1981, 1994) Zimbabwe (1995)  
Ecuador (1982, 1998) Morocco (1980)   
Finland (1991) Netherlands (2008)   
France (2008) Nicaragua (1990)   
Germany (2008) Niger (1983)   
Ghana (1982) Panama (1988)   
Greece (2008) Paraguay (1995)   
Guinea-Bissau (1995) Peru (1983)   
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Table 5.  
The short-term reversal: Bank credit and stock market development during banking crises 
(1970-2008)  
This table reports the relationships between bank credit and stock market development before, during and after the crises. We 
use stock market capitalization to GDP, stock market total value traded to GDP, the stock market turnover ratio and the 
number of listed companies per 10k population as the indicators of stock market development. Ln (GDP per capita) is a 
controlled variable. The sample includes all the banking crises with output losses over 10% of GDP during 1970 to 2008. On 
the assumption that banking crises occur at time=0, “Year<0” stands for pre-crisis time; “Year=0|1” stands for during the 
crisis; “Year=2|3” stands for two years after the crisis; “Year=4|5” stands for four years after the crisis; “Year>5” stands for 
six years after the crisis. 
Dependent variable: Bank Credit 
 Pre-crises Crises Post-crises 
 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 
Stock Market  0.42*** -0.17*** 0.01 0.47 0.15*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.24) (0.31) (0.02) 
GDP per capita 0.31*** -0.07* -0.29 0.06 0.09*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.13) (0.02) 
Constant -2.24*** 1.43*** 1.88** -0.26 -0.34** 
 (0.52) (0.32) (0.92) (1.00) (0.14) 
Observation 182 68 56 55 600 
R2 0.601 0.525 0.247 0.458 0.434 
Total Value Traded 0.11*** -0.07* 0.24 0.06 0.12*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (0.31) (0.02) 
GDP per capita 0.41*** -0.01 -0.18 0.08 0.12*** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.11) (0.31) (0.02) 
Constant -2.95*** 0.79*** 1.81** -0.29 -0.54*** 
 (0.45) (0.28) (0.87) (1.04) (0.14) 
Observation 180 65 57 61 605 
R2 0.539 0.263 0.140 0.189 0.391 
Turnover Ratio 0.03 -0.05*** 0.01 0.05 0.07*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.02) 
GDP per capita 0.49*** 0.03 -0.16 0.09 0.14*** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.11) (0.13) (0.02) 
Constant -3.64*** 0.48* 1.67*** -0.38 -0.68*** 
 (0.56) (0.29) (0.86) (1.09) (0.13) 
Observation 179 64 57 61 622 
R2 0.507 0.033 0.256 0.146 0.375 
No. of Listed Companies -1.07*** -0.41 -0.13 -1.29** 0.01 
 (0.13) (0.72) (0.42) (0.63) (0.01) 
GDP per capita 0.35*** -0.02 -0.14 0.05 0.15*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.12) (0.01) 
Constant -2.14*** 0.86** 1.54* 0.12 -0.80*** 
 (0.47) (0.33) (0.85) (0.94) (0.12) 
Observation 180 66 57 57 637 
R2 0.305 0.430 0.254 0.050 0.370 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, 
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respectively. 
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Table 6.  
The short-term reversal: Bank credit and stock market development during severe 
banking crises (1970-2008)  
This table reports the relationships between bank credit and stock market development before, during and after 
the crises, with a sample of severe banking crises during 1970 to 2008. All the banking crises in the sample had 
output losses over 30% of the countries’ GDP. We use stock market capitalization to GDP, stock market total 
value traded to GDP, the stock market turnover ratio and the number of listed companies per 10k population as 
the indicators of stock market development. Ln (GDP per capita) is a controlled variable. The sample includes 
all the banking crises with output losses over 10% of GDP during 1970 to 2008. On the assumption that banking 
crises occur at time=0, “Year<0” stands for pre-crisis time; “Year=0|1” stands for during the crisis; “Year=2|3” 
stands for two years after the crisis; “Year=4|5” stands for four years after the crisis; “Year>5” stands for six 
years after the crisis. 
Dependent variable: Bank Credit 
 Pre-crises Crises Post-crises 
 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 
Stock Market 0.18*** -0.13*** -0.14 0.27 0.13*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.24) 0.02 
Constant 0.47*** 0.68*** 0.56*** 0.37*** 0.40*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) 0.01 
Observation 123 62 62 62 334 
R2 0.341 0.299 0.483 0.436 0.426 
Total Value Traded 0.05 -0.11*** -0.01 0.09 0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.14) (0.28) 0.02 
Constant 0.54*** 0.62*** 0.51*** 0.46*** 0.43*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) 0.01 
Observation 126 61 62 61 325 
R2 0.190 0.053 0.185 0.189 0.257 
Turnover Ratio -0.03 -0.04** 0.01 0.06 0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) 0.02 
Constant 0.57*** 0.60*** 0.51*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) 0.01 
Observation 124 62 62 61 338 
R2 0.066 0.050 0.057 0.145 0.196 
No. of Listed Companies 0.99*** -0.90 -0.21 -1.17* 0.41** 
 (0.27) (0.94) (0.40) (0.61) 0.20 
Constant 0.43*** 0.72*** 0.54*** 0.62*** 0.41*** 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) 0.03 
Observation 134 66 62 62 341 
R2  0.165 0.235 0.005 0.064 0.351 
Capital Raised 2.12 -0.52 -0.15 -1.21 -0.60** 
 (1.41) (0.53) (0.37) (2.88) 0.28 
Constant 0.72*** 0.96*** 0.82*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 0.01 
Observation 34 24 20 26 110 
R2 overall 0.213 0.121 0.093 0.359 0.255 
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Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of 
significance, respectively. 
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Table 7.  
The short-term reversal: Bank credit and stock market development during market 
crashes (1980-2008) 
This table reports the relationship between bank credit and stock market development during market crashes. On 
the assumption that banking crises occur at time=0, “Year<0” stands for pre-crisis time; “Year=0|1” stands for 
during the crisis; “Year=2|3” stands for two years after the crisis; “Year=4|5” stands for four years after the crisis; 
“Year>5” stands for six years after the crisis. 
Dependent variable: Bank Credit 
 Pre-crises Crises Post-crises 
 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 
Stock Market 0.21*** -0.19 -0.21*** -0.07 0.23*** 
 (0.04) (0.17) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) 
Constant 0.52*** 0.86*** 0.94*** 0.85*** 0.41*** 
 (0.02) (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) 
Observation 65 30 32 32 191 
R2 0.538 0.376 0.382 0.282 0.364 
Total Value Traded 0.13*** -0.11** -0.18* -0.02 0.28*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) 
Constant 0.59*** 0.79*** 0.87*** 0.81*** 0.46*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) 
Observation 65 31 32 32 181 
R2  0.595 0.566 0.598 0.541 0.490 
Turnover Ratio 0.06 -0.09*** -0.01 -0.06 0.27*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.04) 
Constant 0.61*** 0.80*** 0.78*** 0.84*** 0.42*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) 
Observation 65 31 32 32 191 
R2  0.257  0.334 0.196 0.246 0.285 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of 
significance, respectively. 
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Table 8.  
The short-term reversal during banking crises: Subsamples 
The table reports the relationship between the banking sector and the stock market during banking crises, with the subsamples of market-based countries and bank-based 
countries. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the ratio of bank credit to GDP, whereas in Panel B, the dependent variable is the ratio of bank assets to GDP. On the 
assumption that banking crises occur at time=0, “Year<0” stands for pre-crisis time; “Year=0|1” stands for during the crisis; “Year=2|3” stands for two years after the crisis; 
“Year=4|5” stands for four years after the crisis; “Year>5” stands for six years after the crisis. 
Panel A                                                    Dependent variable: Bank Credit 
 (1) A subsample of market-based countries (2) A subsample of bank-based countries 
 Pre-crises Crises Post-crises Pre-crises Crises Post-crises 
 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 
Stock Market   0.17*** -0.30*** -0.15 0.19 0.05* 0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.14) (0.26) 0.03 (0.09) (0.07) (0.17) (0.18) 0.03 
Constant 0.61*** 1.14*** 0.87*** 0.49** 0.56*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.33*** 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.20) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Observation 59 27 24 24 141 62 35 38 38 196 
R2  0.312 0.312 0.366 0.478 0.418 0.014 0.013 0.145 0.281 0.281 
Panel B                                                     Dependent variable: Bank Assets 
 (1) A subsample of market-based countries (2) A subsample of bank-based countries 
 Pre-crises Crises Post-crises Pre-crises Crises Post-crises 
 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 
Stock Market 0.17*** -0.34*** -0.12 0.23 0.08* 0.11 -0.06 0.002 -0.11 0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.14) (0.26) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.03) 
Constant 0.74*** 1.29*** 0.99*** 0.64*** 0.68*** 0.35*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.20) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Observation 59 27 24 24 141 57 33 36 36 194 
R2  0.191 0.260 0.315 0.385 0.366 0.076 0.009 0.107 0.278 0.340 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 9.  
The short-term reversal: Financial structure, inflation and exchange market pressure during banking crises (1970-2008) 
The table reports the relationship between the bank credit and stock market capitalization, taking into account bank concentration and some macroeconomic indicators, such 
as the inflation rate and the exchange market pressure index. On the assumption that banking crises occur at time=0, “Year<0” stands for pre-crisis time; “Year=0|1” stands 
for during the crisis; “Year=2|3” stands for two years after the crisis; “Year=4|5” stands for four years after the crisis; “Year>5” stands for six years after the crisis. 
Dependent variable: Bank Credit 
 Pre-crises Crises Post-crises 
 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 
Stock Market 0.22*** -0.15*** 0.62*** 0.75*** 0.06 
 (0.1) (0.05) (0.19) (0.22) (0.05) 
GDP per capita 0.26*** -0.03 0.12 0.02 0.08* 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) 
Bank Concentration -0.02 0.37 -0.48 0.01 -0.13 
 (0.08) (0.24) (0.38) (0.06) (0.15) 
Inflation -0.12* -0.01** -0.09*** -0.02 -0.06 
 (0.07) (0.005) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12) 
Exchange Market Pressure 0.04 -0.00 0.10*** 0.03 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) 
Constant -1.71** 0.97*** -0.35 -0.01 -0.23 
 (0.72) (0.35) (0.57) (0.42) (0.40) 
Observation 66 31 33 37 98 
R2  0.468 0.216 0.617 0.461 0.323 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 10.  
Financial reforms and financial structure during banking crises 
This table reports the relationships between financial reforms and financial structure during crises. Additionally, the factor of “creditor rights” is included as an independent 
variable. On the assumption that banking crises occur at time=0, “Year<0” stands for pre-crisis time; “Year=0|1” stands for during the crisis; “Year=2|3” stands for two years 
after the crisis; “Year=4|5” stands for four years after the crisis; “Year>5” stands for six years after the crisis. 
Dependent variable: Bank Credit 
 (1) (2) 
 Pre-crises Crises Post-crises Pre-crises Crises Post-crises 
 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 
Stock Market 0.14*** -0.14*** 0.63*** 0.75*** 0.04 0.13*** -0.16*** 0.54*** 0.61*** 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.23) (0.22) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.21) (0.22) (0.04) 
Financial Reform Index -0.11 0.37 -0.16 -0.22 -0.04 -0.17 0.31 -0.27 -0.45 -0.05 
 (0.14) (0.20) (0.19) (0.25) (0.06) (0.16) (0.20) (0.35) (0.38) (0.08) 
Creditor Rights      0.11** 0.08 0.08 0.09* 0.11*** 
      (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) 
GDP per capita 0.20*** -0.03 0.10 0.06 0.10* 0.22*** -0.06 0.14* 0.12* 0.10*** 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) 
Inflation -0.16* -0.02*** -0.07*** -0.05 -0.00*** -0.16** -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.00 
 (0.09) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) 
Exchange Market Pressure 0.02 0.01 0.08*** 0.07 0.00*** 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.00) 
Constant -1.09*** 0.66 -0.42 -0.14 -0.42 -1.40*** 0.77 -0.77 -0.67 -0.60** 
 (0.42) (0.26) (0.55) (0.35) (0.32) (0.32) (0.41) (0.57) (0.49) (0.29) 
Observation 94 41 46 42 88 94 39 44 40 82 
R2  0.506 0.011 0.528 0.498 0.205 0.599 0.039 0.547 0.561 0.473 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.  
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Table 11.  
Financial structure, legal environment and political regime characteristics (robustness tests) 
The table reports the results of the robustness tests, which include legal environment, legal origin and political regime characteristics as controlling variables. On the 
assumption that banking crises occur at time=0, “Year<0” stands for pre-crisis time; “Year=0|1” stands for during the crisis; “Year=2|3” stands for two years after the crisis; 
“Year=4|5” stands for four years after the crisis; “Year>5” stands for six years after the crisis. 
Dependent variable: Bank Credit 
 (1) (2) 
 Pre-crises Crises Post-crises Pre-crises Crises Post-crises 
 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 
Stock Market 0.17*** -0.16*** 0.40** 0.58*** 0.06* 0.18*** -0.17** 0.61*** 0.72*** 0.06* 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.21) (0.20) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.19) (0.20) (0.03) 
GDP per capita 0.21*** -0.08* -0.07 -0.04 0.03*** 0.20*** -0.07* 0.07 0.03 0.09*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
Inflation -0.13* -0.13* -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 -0.15* -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.00 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) 
Exchange Market Pressure 0.01 -0.00 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.08* 0.05 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.00) 
Rule of Law -0.05 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.02      
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)      
Antidirector Rights 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.01      
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03)      
Creditor Rights 0.09 0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.04      
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03)      
English Common Law -0.20 -0.19 0.19 0.25 0.19      
 (0.34) (0.51) (0.36) (0.24) (0.18)      
French Civil Law -0.30 -0.40 -0.10 0.08 -0.04      
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 (0.37) (0.55) (0.36) (0.24) (0.18)      
German Civil Law 0.03 0.31 0.87** 0.73*** 0.51***      
 (0.38) (0.57) (0.40) (0.27) (0.19)      
Political Regime      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant -1.00* -0.42 0.55 0.17 -0.15*** -1.14*** 1.25*** -0.31 -0.08 -0.35 
 (0.38) (0.63) (0.86) (0.68) (0.33) (0.30) (0.34) (0.46) (0.41) (0.23) 
Observation 98 44 44 43 103 98 46 46 45 110 
R2  0.646 0.311 0.656 0.738 0.675 0.533 0.372 0.519 0.481 0.260 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 12.  
Bank credit, stock market and bond market development during banking crises 
This table reports the relationship between the banking sector, the stock market and the corporate bond 
market during banking crises. Panel A uses stock market capitalization to GDP as the indicator of the 
stock market,, whereas Panel B uses the number of listed companies per 10k population as the indictor. 
On the assumption that banking crises occur at time=0, “Year<0” stands for pre-crisis time; “Year=0|1” 
stands for during the crisis; “Year=2|3” stands for two years after the crisis; “Year=4|5” stands for four 
years after the crisis; “Year>5” stands for six years after the crisis.  
Panel A                         Dependent variable: Bank Credit 
 Pre-crises Crises Post-crises 
 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 
Stock Market  0.10** -0.13** 0.26 0.63 0.13* 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.31) (0.42) (0.08) 
GDP per capita 0.23** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.17) (0.15) (0.06) 
Bond Market  0.59** 0.72** 1.17** 0.53 0.91*** 
 (0.28) (0.34) (0.79) (0.66) (0.34) 
Financial Reform Index -0.14 0.23 0.07 -0.71 0.12 
 (0.18) (0.43) (0.81) (0.60) (0.18) 
Bank Concentration -0.02 0.00 -0.47 0.04 0.15 
 (0.07) (0.24) (0.47) (0.04) (0.12) 
Constant -1.4** 0.58 0.61 0.57 -0.08 
 (0.68) (0.45) (1.31) (1.24) (0.45) 
Observation 85 18 22 23 239 
R2 0.370 0.264 0.443 0.382 0.169 
Panel B                         Dependent variable: Bank Credit 
No. of Listed 
Companies 
0.82 9.52 -0.27 -7.19*** -0.21 
 (0.62) (6.48) (15.13) (1.13) (0.19) 
GDP per capita 0.24*** 0.01 -0.40 0.42* 0.11 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.44) (0.19) (0.08) 
Bond Market 0.89*** 1.15** 1.53 3.05** 1.56*** 
 (0.21) (0.42) (5.71) (1.11) (0.21) 
Financial Reform Index -0.07 0.66 4.29 -4.71** 0.10 
 (0.22) (0.65) (4.79) (1.46) (0.12) 
Bank Concentration 0.04 -0.06 -0.19 -0.05 0.24** 
 (0.09) (0.38) (0.82) (0.08) (0.10) 
Constant -1.79* -1.02 0.85 0.50 -0.97 
 (0.51) (1.12) (4.04) (1.25) (0.68) 
Observation 85 18 22 23 242 
R2 0.359 0.353 0.062 0.017 0.155 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of 
significance, respectively.
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Table 13.  
Bank assets and stock market development during banking crises 
The table reports the relationship between the banking sector and the stock market during banking 
crises, with the ratio of bank assets to GDP as a dependent variable. On the assumption that banking 
crises occur at time=0, “Year<0” stands for pre-crisis time; “Year=0|1” stands for during the crisis; 
“Year=2|3” stands for two years after the crisis; “Year=4|5” stands for four years after the crisis; 
“Year>5” stands for six years after the crisis. 
Dependent variable: Bank Assets 
 Pre-crises Crises Post-crises 
 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 
Stock Market 0.16* -0.18*** 0.38 0.72*** 0.07** 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.26) (0.28) (0.03) 
Bank Concentration -0.00 0.40* -0.26 0.06 -0.00 
 (0.13) (0.23) (0.51) (0.12) (0.10) 
GDP per capita 0.28*** -0.15*** -0.04 -0.15 -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.15) (0.14) (0.03) 
Inflation  -0.14 -0.17 -0.07 -0.02 -0.18 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.15) 
Exchange Market 
Pressure 
0.08 0.00 0.08 0.03 -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.00) 
Rule of Law 0.01 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.07** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.10) (0.07) (0.03) 
Antidirector Rights -0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.06 -0.04 
 (0.25) (0.29) (0.15) (0.09) (0.05) 
Creditor Rights 0.14 -0.00 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.08) (0.04) 
English Common Law -0.16 -0.07 0.77 0.37 0.43* 
 (0.92) (1.01) (0.69) (0.38) (0.26) 
French Civil Law -0.18 -0.51 0.41 0.28 0.14 
 (1.08) (1.12) (0.63) (0.37) (0.25) 
German Civil Law 0.27 0.46 1.14* 1.11*** 0.97*** 
 (0.97) (1.02) (0.65) (0.39) (0.26) 
Constant -1.88 0.97 -0.39 0.76 0.40 
 (1.73) (1.77) (1.63) (1.19) (0.42) 
Observation 66 29 31 35 91 
R2  0.595 0.263 0.732 0.702 0.711 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of 
significance, respectively. 
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Table 14. 
Private credit, stock market capitalization and financial reforms during banking crises 
The table reports the relationship between the banking sector and the stock market during banking crises, with the ratio of private credit to GDP as a dependent variable. On 
the assumption that banking crises occur at time=0, “Year<0” stands for pre-crisis time; “Year=0|1” stands for during the crisis; “Year=2|3” stands for two years after the 
crisis; “Year=4|5” stands for four years after the crisis; “Year>5” stands for six years after the crisis. 
Dependent variable: Private Credit 
 (1) (2) 
 Pre-crises Crises Post-crises Pre-crises Crises Post-crises 
 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 Year<0 Year=0|1 Year=2|3 Year=4|5 Year>5 
Stock Market 0.15* -0.16* 0.68*** 0.81*** 0.06 0.09 -0.34*** 0.42* 0.43* 0.05 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.24) (0.23) (0.05) (0.09) (0.13) (0.24) (0.26) (0.05) 
Bank Concentration -0.01 0.23 -0.48 -0.03 -0.13 -0.02 -1.61*** -0.31 -0.07 0.04 
 (0.11) (0.33) (0.49) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.38) (0.65) (0.16) (0.17) 
GDP per capita 0.33*** -0.05 0.21** 0.15** 0.18*** 0.33*** -0.04 -0.09 0.15 0.20*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.12) (0.18) (0.16) (0.07) 
Inflation  -0.15* -0.01 -0.11* -0.05 -0.22 -0.14* -0.45** -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.21) (0.08) (0.22) (0.06) (0.09) (0.19) 
Exchange Market Pressure 0.04 -0.00 0.11* 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.12) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.00) 
Financial Reform Index -0.20 0.89 -0.38 -0.45 -0.10 -0.20 2.78*** 0.33 -0.19 0.00 
 (0.23) (0.55) (0.82) (0.54) (0.21) (0.23) (1.06) (1.04) (0.45) (0.20) 
Rule of Law      -0.00 0.12** 0.11 0.04 -0.02 
      (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) 
Antidirector Rights      0.06 -0.11* -0.01 -0.03 0.06 
      (0.14) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05) 
Creditor Rights      0.08 0.14*** -0.03 0.04 0.02 
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      (0.09) (0.04) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) 
English Common Law      0.15 0.61** -0.01 0.37 0.44* 
      (0.51) (0.28) (0.54) (0.31) (0.23) 
French Civil Law      -0.11 -0.33 -0.36 -0.03 -0.04 
      (0.60) (0.27) (0.48) (0.25) (0.23) 
German Civil Law      0.29 0.02 0.74 0.56** 0.41* 
      (0.53) (0.25) (0.58) (0.27) (0.23) 
Constant -2.06 0.50 -0.80 -0.65 -0.80** -0.28** -0.39 0.68 -1.00 -1.42 
 (0.49) (0.62) (0.68) (0.45) (0.37) （1.05） (0.84) (1.50) (1.17) (0.62) 
Observation 62 26 33 34 77 62 24 31 32 71 
R2  0.665 0.050 0.706 0.686 0.553 0.798 0.960 0.863 0.889 0.867 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
